CHAPTER VIII

SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN: THE COLLECTION OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE

Under normal peacetime conditions, the bulk of the information on which a government bases its action in the international field is obtainable by overt means -- that is to say, through diplomatic and military establishments, through the press, scientific and technical publications and the normal channels of trade and international intercourse. With these facilities available, the collection of intelligence in peacetime through secret means assumes relatively secondary importance. In fact, as mentioned above, insofar as our own Government is concerned, covert collection of intelligence was a negligible factor prior to World War II.

Today it is an understatement to describe conditions as merely abnormal. They are uniquely difficult from the vicupoint of intelligence. Where Communist regimes are in control the ordinary means of securing information are generally lacking. In these areas, it is true, we have a few diplomatic missions and here and there some consular establishments. Their staffs, however, are so restricted and spied upon that they cannot perform their usual information gathering functions. Even the type of information that is available for the asking here in the United States is unobtainable there. In this whole great area of communist domination it is not only military information which is kept secret, but it is hard to get even simple and secringly innocuous details relating to the economic, financial and political developments which may furnish vital class to political and military trents.

107

Also, the methods of fifth column penetration practiced by the Communists follow a unique pattern in various foreign countries and in the United States which calls for the best that we have in the field of counter-intelligence.

As a result of this, there is an urgent call upon our skill and ingenuity to fini methods of informing ourselves about Iron Curtain countries. As we cannot do it adequately by orthodox methods, an increasingly heavy burden is placed on our secret intelligence and counter-intelligence and hence they have today a higher priority in our over-all intelligence picture than in the past.

THE CHARTER OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TO CONDUCT SECRET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES


The responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency for the collection of covert intelligence abroad are performed as a "service of common concern" in accordance with the terms of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5 of December 12, 1947. (See Annex No. 11). Unlike the collection of overt intelligence, where the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency is a limited one, the collection of practically all covert foreign intelligence is assigned to the Agency.

Intelligence Directive No. 5 gives to the Central Intelligence Agency the following duties:

- a. To conduct all organized federal espionage operations abroad, except for agreed activities by other departments and agencies.
- b. To conduct all organized federal counter-espionage abroad, including occupied areas.
- c. To coordinate covert and overt intelligence collection, and to coordinate the activities of casual agents employed on covert missions by

UNCLASSIFIED

TASSIFIED



other departments and agencies, members of the Intelligence Advisor-Committee.

d. To disseminate the intelligence thus obtained to the various departments and agencies having an authorized interest in it.

Covert collection thus includes espionage and counter-espionage abroad, i. e., the clandestine collection of information and counter-action against foreign secret intelligence activities. It does not include intelligence collection by secret but essentially technical means, such as communications intelligence.

National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 2 sets forth the respective responsibilities of the departmental agencies for collection of certain entegories of foreign intelligence information. The Army was thus given primary responsibility for collecting foreign military information, the Navy naval information, the State Department political, cultural, and sociological information, etc. The effect of Directive No. 5, however, is to limit these responsibilities to overt collection, and set aside the entire field of covert intelligence operations (with a few exceptions) as the domain of the Central Intelligence Asoncy. Turther, the igency is "responsible for coordinating covert and overt intelligence collection activities," and is also charged with coordinating the activities of casual covert agents employed by other agencies with its own "organized covert activities."

It is important to note, in this connection, that the National Security Council has rejected, and we believe rightly, the concept that espionage might be conflucted by several agencies, each independent of the other, and each withorized to operate in the same areas with roughly the same objectives. Exittiple espionage of this kind has occasionally been advocated as a means of 109.

IRCLASSIFIED

protecting security. It is argued that the penetration of a centralized espionage agency might destroy its entire roster of agents, leaving the ration without an effective secret intelligence service in time of crisis, whereas penetration of one of several espionage units might destroy its networks, but would leave those of the others untouched.

We consider this view to be largely theoretical, provided espionage is properly conducted to keep the identity of chains entirely separate and if proper security is raintained in the central office. In any event, we feel that this danger is less serious than the confusion and overlapping in the field of espionage which would result if several services were engaged in it. Adoption of a centralized espionage structure has meant that, except for certain operations in occupied areas, the foreign covert operations of other agencies of the Government have been dissolved or turned over to the Central Intelligence Agency.

ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

The Central Intelligence Agency does not enter the intricate field of foreign espiciese and counter-espiciese without some background of experience. The covert operations unit, known as the Office of Special Operations (050), is in effect the legatee of the operating experience, the records, and many of the personnel of the secret intelligence (SI) and counter-espiciage (X-2) branches of the former Office of Strategic Services and Strategic Services Unit, war Department. It also inherits the valuable relationships built up by these organizations with certain foreign intelligence services,



In numerous instances the Office of Special Operations has maintained

IMUI VCCILI





field stations originally opened by the Office of Strategic Services and maintained by the Strategic Services Unit. In its headquarters structure it has drawn heavily upon the previous experience of these organizations in conducting war and post-war operations.

Administratively, the Office of Special Operations is on the same level as the four other Offices of the Central Intelligence Agency. Contact with the Director is maintained almost exclusively by its chief, the Assistant Director for Special Operations, and his deputy. The Assistant Director's personal staff also includes an Executive Secretary, whose duties are approximately that of an executive officer, and several consultants and advisers who deal with particular aspects of agent operations, archives, budget and the like.

Under the Assistant Director, the organization is divided into three major | operating groups.

The Operations Group is responsible for the actual conduct of espionage and counter-espionage. Its major subdivisions are seven regional branches, each of which controls and guides covert operations in the particular area abroad for which it is responsible. These operating branches function independently of each other except at the top level, where branch chiefs coordinate functions involving more than one area. Security of branch operations is thus fairly well maintained within headquarters. It is the policy to assign personnel to a particular area or country for considerable periods to gain adequate a supposed for sound operations. Arrangements exist for the assignment of headquarters personnel to the field, and vice versa, although a comprehensive longuarters personnel to the field, and vice versa, although a comprehensive

111

Several staff units, including a deputy chief of operations for counterespionage, assist the brunches in directing operations of particular kinds, and in assuring orderly dissoldination of the secret intelligence materials obtained as a result of operations.

The scientific and technical section of the Office of Special Operations assists the regional branches in directing operations likely to produce information in these fields. The section works closely with the Nuclear Energy Group of the Office and has seen contact with the Scientific Branch of the Office of Reports and Estimates.* For its own part, it receives direction through the Nuclear Energy Group, departmental intelligence collection requests submitted via the Office of Collection and Dissemination, and the Scientific Branch, Office of Reports and Estimates.


The Information Control Section is concerned with directing the work of the regional branches, analyzing and controlling their output, and reviewing the comments on reports of the Office of Special Operations received from the Office of Reports and Estimates and occasionally from departmental agencies. This is the point to which intelligence requirements of other agencies are sent by the Office of Collection and Dissemination. It is responsible for the editorial review of intelligence reports prepared by the branches of the Office of Special Operations.

Approved preports are forwarded by the Information Control Section to the Office of Collection and Dissemination, which then determines the agencies to which they will be disseminated. When urgent dissemination is required by the nature of a report received, members of the section may deliver it personally





^{*} See footnote below, page 115.



to authorized recipients. This distribution is subject to review by the Office of Collection and Dissemination, which may extend it to other agencies on its own initiative. In line with our recommendation, given below, to give the Office of Special Operations greater independence and autonomy and to bring it in closer contact with the principal users of its product, we recommend that the power to determine dissemination of its reports should rest largely in the Office of Special Operations itself. In order to bring the Office closer to its chief consumers, we also recommend that there be included in the Information Control Section representatives of each of the Services and of the Department of State.

Training of staff members and career agents is undertaken by the training section of the Operations Group. Several courses in basic and advanced intelligence are given to administrative and operational personnel. The courses emphasize practical problems of field operations, not only for administrative and secretarial personnel, but also for staff members who will conduct operations. The building of a corps of trained personnel for secret intelligence work is one of the crucial problems which the Office of Special Operations has to face.

The Operations Group also includes a section which analyzes the needs of the operational units for special devices and equipment. Actual development of such equipment is supervised by the Administrative Group, but is conducted in close collaboration with ranbers of this section.

The second major division of the Office of Special Operations is the Finistrative Group, headed by a chief and deputy chief, which has hitherto had responsibility under the Assistant Director for such matters as supply and transportation, special funds, personnel, central files, cover and

113

THE ACCUID

documentation. The Administrative Group also controls field communications which we recommend should be brought into closer contact with the Operations Group.

As we mentioned in Chapter III, consideration is now being given in the Central Intelligence Agency to the removal of all of those services except for central files, cover and documentation, and communications to the Executive for Administration where they would be beyond the direct authority and control of the Assistant Director for Special Operations.

We consider that the Office of Special Operations and its closely related services should be largely autonomous and self-sufficient. Hence, we believe that this proposed transfer of its administrative services is unsound. From the point of view of internal security we also deprecate it. As a general rule, secret administrative support should be as close and as accessible to secret operations as possible. The most elementary rules of security are breached when overt and covert administrative units are placed together; and by the same token the unique character of secret operations renders inapplicable most ordinary rules of administration. Removal of administrative support from the direct authority of the official responsible for secret operations would vitiate his ability to conduct the very operations with which he is charged.

The third major division of the Office of Special Operations is the Nuclear Energy Group. Unlike the Operations and Administrative Divisions which we have discussed above, it has no direct contact with agent operations or collection but is an analyzer and consumer of secret intelligence. Its character, indeed, is that of a reports staff studying foreign research and developments in the field of nuclear energy. Historically, the Group was



IMPOLACCICIEN



organized in the Manhattan District and was transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency at the time of the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission. Attached first to the Director of Central Intelligence, it was later transferred to the Scientific Branch of the Office of Reports and Estimates where, because of its analytic and reporting functions, it logically belonged. It was afterwards (early 1943) moved to the Office of Special Operations because of difficulties within the Scientific Branch.

The success of the Nuclear Energy Group will be measured in terms of the effectiveness of its relationship to the Atomic Energy Commission, one of its major consumers, and to the National Military Establishment. The Group's work with these agencies has been considerably improved in recent months by the appointment of a highly competent scientist as the Chief of Intelligence in the Atomic Energy Commission and the functioning of an inter-agency committee concerned exclusively with atomic energy intelligence.

As we have indicated, it is obvious that from a functional point of view, the Euclear Energy Group does not belong in the Office of Special Operations. As a research unit, its place is clearly with the Scientific Branch of the proposed Research and Reports Division, the successor to the Office of Reports and Estimates.*

Before concluding our survey of the headquarters organization of the Diffice of Special Operations, we wish to add a recommendation to which we attach particular importance and which affects the relationship of this Office to other covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.




steps have been taken to transfer the Nuclear Energy Group to a new Office of Scientific Intelligence.

In Chapters VII and IX we briefly consider the similarity of the operations and administrative problems faced by the Office of Special Operations, the Office of Policy Coordination and the Contract Branch of the Office of Operations. All three offices carry on activities of a highly confidential nature. These activities are inter-related and require close coordination. In addition they are able insteadly to service each other. This is particularly true of the overeeas operations of the Office of Special Operations and the Office of Policy Coordination. We recommend that the three activities be placed under the common control of a single directing head who would be one of the chief assistants of the Director. The three Offices might be set up as separate branches of a common service of secret activities which should enjoy large autonomy within the Central Intelligence Agency and might appropriately be called Operations Division. Whether eventually a closer merger of the three activities should be effected can best be determined in the light of experience.

As a part of such a central organization devoted to covert operations, centralized administrative services should be established under the single chief of covert activities, and should not be identified with or combined with the administrative arrangements made for the balance of the Central Intelligence Agency. The covert organization thus established should, in particular, undertake its own personnel recruitment, using the facilities of the personnel section of the Central Intelligence Agency only insofar as they appear to serve the purpose of the covert organization.

In making this recommendation, we appreciate that the Office of Policy Coordination under NSC 10/2 has a special relationship to the Secretary of






State and the Secretary of Defense. We believe that substantial benefits would accrue in having this same relationship established, through the head of the Operations Division, with both of the secret overseas activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, assuming that they and the Contact Branch are brought together in the ranner we recommend above.

In this recommendation we have also had in mind the desirability of quickly establishing a particularly close relationship between the secret activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Military Establishment and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in case of war. If the measure of autonomy we suggest for these services is achieved, they could be attached, without delay, to the Secretary of Defense or to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if the National Security Council should consider this advisable.

Subject to the foregoing recommendation, we believe that the headquarters organization of the Office of Special Operations is soundly conceived and has made a satisfactory start toward setting up our secret intelligence work.

FIELD ACTIVITIES OF COVERT INTELLIGENCE



UNGLASSIFIE

 1^{-1} 118 1801

INT 845/125

In some countries, contact has been established with local police, intelligence, or counter-intelligence services. These relations are often most useful, and their potentialities for the future are great. The most successful example is the continuing liaison

In certain friendly but threatened countries, the Office of Special Operations has begun arranging with these services for the installation of stay-behind egents to be used in the event of a military emergency. In most instances independent networks are also being built up.

The agent operations of the Office of Special Operations abroad have been criticized as being too frequently directed against fairly obvious, short-term objectives, and as having overlooked or failed to exploit strategic targets. The Office is also sometimes criticized in the departmental agencies and in the Office of Reports and Estimates for producing quantity rather than quality. It can in part answer such criticism by showing that it has not received adequate directives from the policy-makers. This serious failure should be remedied.

Field operations are conducted by the Office of Special Operations in Germany, Austria, Japan and Korea, where United States military forces occupy all or part of the country. Close limits on with the theatre intelligence withcritis has become a matter of the first importance, since operations are important upon military facilities, and because the military commander is a common of a significant part of the intelligence collected by local operations.

119

The field relationship is complicated by the fact that the theatre commanders, under National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5, are permitted to employ casual or other secret agents as a part of their local intelligence collection activities. Technically, the Central Intelligence Agency is empowered to coordinate these local agent activities with its own operations in the same area; but there is no evidence to suggest that any active program of coordination is undertaken by the Office of Special Operations or other Central Intelligence Agency authority in any country occurred by United States troops. In view of the wide powers exercised by the occuration commanders in their respective areas, we recognize the difficulties of effecting this coordination, but we believe further effort should be made in this direction, particularly in the handling of defectors which we discussed

Fortunately, the liaison between the field stations of the Office of Special Operations and the Army intelligence staffs, particularly in Germany and Austria, are close and this may in part make up for lack of more forcal coordination of covert activities.



communiars, in the exercise of their occupation responsibilities, must conduct


120



HAM ACCILLI

INT 245/12

certain tactical intelligence and counter-intelligence operations. In our opinion, if they undertake long-term or strategic operations of a clandestine nature, such activities should be coordinated by the Central Intelligence Agency in order to prevent serious overlap of operations and consequent danger to security.



As a phase of the relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency and military commands, it may be noted that firm arrangements have not yet been completed for the conduct of secret intelligence operations in a military theatre in wartime. Present planning follows the theory that units of the Office of Special Operations should be attached at an Army or Army Group level, with no personnel responsible directly to any lower echelon of command. Although operations would be conducted in the areas of particular corps, divisions or even lower echelons, control and authority would be exercised exclusively at the Army or Army Group level.

Field stations conducting the operations which we have outlined in the preceding paragraphs report all intelligence directly to headquarters, but are obliged to show material of interest to the local chief of mission or military






The encouragement of defection of strategically placed personnel in Soviet and satellite government services should be another major objective of the field operations of the Office of Special Operations and to some extent of the Office of Policy Coordination. A few successes have been achieved in such activities, but thus fer most Soviet defections have been largely fortuitons. In our opinion, neither the Central Intelligence Agency nor the Army has fully exploited the intelligence possibilities of numerous individuals who have filtered into the American zones of Germany and Austria. Often interrogations have been so delayed or so conducted as to be virtually fruitless.

There is also a domestic phase of this problem both in the case of defectors in the United States and in the headling of those who may be brought here. The entire question, both at home and abroad, clearly involves the coordination of intelligence activities and is an important one with which the Central Intelligence Agency should deal. Here it should assume its responsibilities to work out a more effective procedure to coordinate the activities of the various agencies involved. (See Chapter IV).

SECURITY OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES



A breach of security respecting secret operations which received wide public notice, but for which the Office of Special Operations was not itself responsible, took place in connection with the Bogota riots in April, 1948. (See above, page 55). Subsequently, magazine and newspaper articles have tended to identify the Central Intelligence Agency as the center of American secret intelligence collection and of little else. All this has reflected on the security of field operations.

Before turning from the question of operational security, it may be observed that the headquarters security of the Office of Special Operations is not impeccable. (See above, page 34). It occupies a separate building readily identifiable as belonging to the Central Intelligence Agency. Secret operations of this nature should preferably be located in a building having so many services and visitors that the identification of a secret staff and their visitors would be rendered difficult. Further, the staff could note casily over the explanation of its work by giving a well-known and relatively infocuous address.



In general, personnel of the Office of Special Operations make no attempt to concert their employment by the Central Intelligence Agency so long as they are assigned to the headquarters staff, but do seek to hide their identity as members of their particular Office. When transferred to non-vouchered accounts as a preliminary to being sent abroad, they are often not given adequate cover explanations to draw attention from their apparent suddent transfer out of the Central Intelligence Agency to a diplomatic post abroad.


There is no easy solution to this problem. We must recognize that it is aggrevated by putting so many eggs in the Central Intelligence Agency bashed. We believe the solution lies along the lines we recommend in this report -- namely, to divide the functions of the Central Intelligence Agency generally into two parts: (1) the overt, recognized and admitted functions of coordination and central appraiser and evaluator and (2) the covert activities of the Office of Special Operations, Office of Policy Coordination, etc. The two could be physically and, to a large extent, functionally separated. Persons working for the one would openly admit their connections while those working for the other would find various and differing types of cover.

The Central Intelligence Agency should then endeavor to reverse the present unfortunate trend where it finds itself advertised almost exclusively as a secret service organization and become to the public the centralizer and coordinator of intelligence, not the secret gatherer. If the changes we are recommending are effected, they would furnish a good point of departure for the Central Intelligence Agency to do this.

COUNTER-ESPIONACE

Espionage and counter-espionage have been unified in the Operations Croup of the Office of Special Operations. This arrangement represents a departure





from the wartime structure of the Office of Strategic Services in which these activities were conducted in separate branches. It is also different from most foreign services, which have separate espionage and counter-espionage branches, integrated only through their chiefs. Possibly because of this organizational unification counter-espionage has not yet been adequately exploited as a source of positive intelligence information, as a channel for deception, as a means of protecting espionage operations and as a basis for penetrating fifth column operations abroad, which may be tied in with fifth column operations here.

The techniques of espionage seem somewhat simpler than those of counter-espionage, and the former generally is assumed to promise more decisive results. Factors such as these have influenced the concentration of the Office of Special Operations on espionage problems. It seems apparent that the present counter-espionage staff of the Office of Special Operations should be materially strengthened and more intensive counter-espionage work promoted.

Owing to the subordination of counter-espionage to espionage, the exploitation by the Office of Special Operations of counter-intelligence opportunities and its general approach to the problems of counter-intelligence have not been markedly successful. Its liaison arrangements with the Federal Pureau of Investigation, which is charged with all counter-espionage responsibilities in the United States, except these affecting personnel of the Armed Services, have been limited for the most part to exchange of information on suspect individuals.

Full collaboration on counter-espicance plans and operations has not yet been achieved, and neither organization is fully acquainted with the over-all 125


IINC: ASSIFIED

program of the other. Since the danger of foreign espionage and the merces of fifth column activities does not stop or start at our national boundaries, it is desirable that the two agencies most concerned with counter-espionage should maintain closer relations with each other. We have already pointed out in Chapter IV the extent of the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency to insure coordination of certain counter-intelligence activities of the Government. We can only observe here that a major aspect of such coordination is a close working relationship between the Office of Special Operations and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE

126

UNC'LASSIFIED



THE NEED FOR POLICY DIRECTION OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE

To be genuinely effective, secret intelligence operations must be directed toward the intelligence objectives of greatest importance to the Government. Today, as we mentioned above, the Office of Special Operations lacks the direction which it needs to insure the maximum relevancy of its operations to the problems of foreign and military policy. It is, indeed, a fundamental failing of the American intelligence services that, in general, they are not edvised of the current needs of policy-makers. Unfortunately, continuing effort is rarely made by intelligence consumers to guide intelligence activities toward the most meaningful targets.

The formal requirement lists of the military services are received by the Office of Special Operations; generally speaking, these are of a "spot", chortterm nature. They are often transmitted with the implied expectation that the desired answers can be secured almost immediately. Adequate guidance from the State Department is lacking, except in the cases of a few officers of the Office of Special Operations who maintain personal contact with policy officers in the State Department. No regular evaluatory or other comments are received on the intelligence reports put out by the Office except from the Office of Experts and Estimates which is not necessarily the best source for such judgments. It is thus deprived of the guidance in specific cases which Service agencies and the State Department could supply.

We believe that these deficiencies would be remedied, at least in part, by the attachment to the Office of Special Operations, as suggested earlier in this chapter, of representatives from the Department of State and the Services and by the creation of a more direct relationship to the Secretaries of State; and Defense.

127



CMINERAL APPRAISAL

In appraising the general results of the operations of the Office of Special Operations, it is too early to arrive at definite conclusions. Certain operations now being conducted, hitherto lacking in results, may prove to be of the first importance at some time in the future. It can be said, however, that the Office has been successful in securing certain categories of valuable intelligence. It has also established or maintained relations with the intelligence services of several friendly countries, not only for the exchange of information but, in some cases, for the conduct of operations.


Many priority targets of secret intelligence remain untouched. Few significant operations have been conducted within the Soviet Union, and operational planning for others remains at a fairly early stage. We recognize the vast difficulties of this type of undertaking and the need for extreme caution.

Throughout the departmental intelligence services, as we have remarked earlier, there exists ageneral feeling that the results of secret intelligence operations have not yet attained the level which the current concentration of personnel and funds should warrant. This, we believe, is in part due to the lack of sufficiently intimate liaison between the Office of Special Operations, the Services and the State Department.

In thus assessing achievements, it cannot be forgotten that the agency is still very young. This is the reason for some of the defects which have been pointed out in the foregoing discussion. The organization does have the services of some highly telented and experienced persons, both in headquarters and in the field. Their presence gives promise of systematic improvement for their work as a whole.

128





CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- (1) The covert operations of the Office of Special Operations and Office of Policy Coordination and the activities of the Contact Branch of the Office of Operations should be integrated, and the three operations should be trought together under single over-all direction (Operations Division) within the Central Intelligence Agency.*
- (2) Covert intelligence activities conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies in occupied areas should be reviewed in order to effect close coordination.
- (3) Measures should be initiated within the Central Intelligence Agency looking toward better coordination of the handling of defectors, which concerns American intelligence agencies abroad as well as in the continental United States.
- (4) The Office of Special Operations (or the new Operations Division) must give primary attention to the building up of a corps of trained personnel for operations abroad.
- (5) The cover policies of the Office of Special Operations in the field should be generally reviewed and tightened. Continuous and careful consideration should be given to increasing the use of non-official cover at the same time that demands for diplomatic or military cover are reduced to a minimum.
- (6) The counter-espionage activities of the Office of Special Operations chould be increased in scope and exphasis, and closer limited in this field the catablished with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- (7) Relations with departmental agencies should be brought closer, and the cuidence which the Office of Special Operations receives from intelligence



^{*} For our recommendations regarding the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch of the Office of Operations, see Chapter VII.

consumers should be strengthened. This might be achieved by including representatives of the Service agencies and the State Department in the Information Control Section of the Office of Special Operations.

- (8) The Director should assure himself that the Office of Special Operations is receiving adequate information on the current and strategic intelligence needs of the Government. This might be achieved by establishing closer relations with the Secretaries of State and Defense.
- (9) The Office of Special Operations should exercise a greater measure of control over the dissemination of its own material.
- (10) The Nuclear Energy Group should be moved from the Office of Special Operations to the proposed Research and Reports Division where it should be a part of the general scientific work.
- (11) The Office of Special Operations should have access to communications intelligence to the full extent required for guidance in directing its operations and for more effective conduct of counter-espionage.